Finansowanie południowokoreańskiego cudu gospodarczego – w świetle rekomendacji konsensusu waszyngtońskiego

This paper addresses the topic of the methods used to finance accelerated economic growth in South Korea during Park Chung Hee’s rule (1961–1979). The author describes government policy concerning foreign direct investment and banking credit and takes a position in the dispute between neoclassical and statist economists concerning the mechanisms of the Korean economic miracle. Discussing the issue of financing Korean industrial development, she refers to the economic policy prescriptions described in the Washington Consensus. The author argues that not only did Korea not comply with these prescriptions, but contradictory measures constituted the building blocks of its developmental state policy. The decision to base economic development on local companies facilitated the creation of a comprehensive and strong industrial structure which enabled high economic growth for the following decades. Credit policy implemented by state-owned banks was the main tool for coordinating private-sector investment decisions and ensuring high performance.